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Why do wicked problems often give birth to bad policy choices?
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myopia, political stalemate, narrow-mindedness, fear and risk aversion,
hubris, greed, rational self-interest, ignorance, reliance on emotionally
appealing but misleading anecdotal stories, misuse of evidence, and
misunderstanding of uncertainty.
Amid these divergent explanations, two classes emerge: one lies
in the shortcomings and mistakes of the problem solvers, and the other
lies in the nature of the problem itself. One stance is to fault the
ostensible problem solvers: people are not always rational, fair, patient,
thoughtful, or deliberative, but instead are myopic, selfish, greedy,
power hungry, or out for revenge (among other motivations). And
though we call them problem solvers, many are not trying to solve
problems, but rather seek gains through the process. As such, the
framework that planners often assume—that the urban world presents
problems and we then seek solutions—misstates how many individuals,
firms, and institutions see and engage with the world: a world not as a
set of problems, but rather as a set of opportunities and threats.
The second stance is to point to the nature of the problem. This
is the focus of this Article. In particular, we examine how the dynamics
of wicked problems1 undermine traditional problem-solving efforts.
This is not to absolve the problem solvers of responsibility for poor
policy choices. It is the responsibility of policymakers to diagnose the
distinctive challenges and needs of wicked problems and act
accordingly. As urban planning scholars, we focus on entrenched urban
problems. This focus is not accidental. Horst Rittel (an architect) and
Melvin Webber (a planning theorist and transportation planner)
developed the idea of “wicked problems” at the University of California,
Berkeley’s College of Environmental Design in the early 1970s2—an era
when the optimism of solving complex social issues through technical,
scientific solutions was colliding hard with the failure of such efforts to

1.
For a thorough discussion of wicked problems, see Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber,
Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIS. 155 (1973). Rittel and Webber describe
several common characteristics of wicked problems: (1) “[t]here is no definitive formulation of a
wicked problem”; (2) “[w]icked problems have no stopping rule”; (3) “[s]olutions to wicked problems
are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad”; (4) “[t]here is no immediate and no ultimate test of a
solution to a wicked problem”; (5) “[e]very solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation;’
because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly”; (6)
“[w]icked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential
solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into
the plan”; (7) “[e]very wicked problem is essentially unique”; (8) “[e]very wicked problem can be
considered to be a symptom of another problem”; (9) “[t]he existence of a discrepancy representing
a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways,” and “[t]he choice of explanation determines
the nature of the problem’s resolution”; and (10) “[t]he planner has no right to be wrong.” Id.
at 161–67.
2.
See id. at 155–69.
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conclusively resolve urban poverty, inequality, deindustrialization,
racism, white flight, and the violence of the “Urban Crisis.”
In this Article, we build on previous research3 to demonstrate
how complexity thinking can engage urban challenges at three levels:
(1) describing “complexity” as a symptom of urban systems; (2)
analyzing the dynamics of complex urban systems; and ultimately (3)
intervening through appropriate planning strategies that account for
complexity.4 We employ this thinking to engage the politics of
sustainability at the same three levels, illustrating this at two
geographic scales: the neighborhood5 (specifically, the challenge of
ecogentrification) and the megaregion6 (and the resulting regional
externalities and trade-offs). These scales involve actors, conflicts, and
specializations within planning. Yet both represent new, hybrid
patterns of urbanization that produce intractable problems of
environmental unsustainability and social-spatial inequality—two core
planning priorities that too often collide. Both situations also generate
novel social policy challenges that conventional planning, thinking, and
governance tools are ill-equipped to address. These challenges instead
call for interdepartmental or intergovernmental cooperation.
The first case we examine is ecogentrification, an unexpected
portmanteau of two once-separate planning concerns: threats to
ecological sustainability arising from material-intensive urban
lifestyles, and neighborhood displacement as both symptom and
exacerbator of inequality.7 The unlikely alliance of green development
and gentrification, amid growing income inequality, is producing
affluent, exclusionary “green islands” of high livability surrounded by
gray hardscapes of poverty, heat islands, unhealthy environments, and
poor services.8 Ecogentrification exposes deep-seated tensions between

3.
See Moira Zellner & Scott D. Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity: Pathways to
Extend Planning with Complex Systems Modelling, in HANDBOOK ON PLANNING AND COMPLEXITY
258 (Gert de Roo, Claudia Yamu & Christian Zuidema eds., 2020) [hereinafter Zellner & Campbell,
Planning With(In) Complexity]; Moira Zellner & Scott D. Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted
Problems: What Can We Learn from Aligning Complex Systems and Wicked Problems?, 16 J. PLAN.
THEORY & PRAC. 457 (2015) [hereinafter Zellner & Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted Problems].
4.
See infra Parts I & II.
5.
See infra Section III.A (Case 1: Ecogentrification).
6.
See infra Section III.B (Case 2: Megaregional Sustainability: A New Geography in Search
of Governance).
7.
See Jennifer L. Rice, Daniel Aldana Cohen, Joshua Long & Jason R. Jurjevich,
Contradictions of the Climate-Friendly City: New Perspectives on Eco-Gentrification and Housing
Justice, 4 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 145, 146 (2019) (noting that the term “ ‘ecological
gentrification’ . . . describe[s] the processes by which homeless populations are displaced from
urban parks as part of ecological improvement projects”).
8.
NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF REDEVELOPMENT AND
REVITALIZATION EFFORTS IN FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 2–3 (2006),
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the search for environmental equality, housing equality, and dynamic
housing markets. This confluence of divergent forces generates novel
forms of urbanization—a hallmark of emergent complex systems. 9 And,
characteristic of wicked problems, there is no consensus about the
nature of the problem (housing, environment, income?), the jurisdiction
that oversees it, or the solutions.10 This lack of consensus raises a
perplexing question of governance: Who is responsible for the problem
and for solving it? And if no single agency claims ownership of the
problem, responsibility falls between the cracks.
The second case is megaregional sustainability, which
represents a tantalizing new scale of urban development and spatial
analysis.11 Yet our administrative capacities and political culture have
not kept up with the megaregion’s conceptual idea. While the
megaregion is an appealing idea of spatial organization in search of a
corresponding governance structure,12 we lack the ability to mitigate
externalities, counter the negative effects of agglomeration, and
address trade-offs (e.g., growth at the expense of air pollution). The
megaregion presents a paradox of both promises and troubles: in
theory, the scale better encompasses both environmental (watersheds,
air basins, habitats) and social (city-suburb-rural, interracial)
systems.13 Yet the megaregion also privileges consolidated economic
interests over ecological and social justice interests.14
We conclude with implications for governance. Each discipline
defines governance on its own terms. Urbanists view governance
broadly, including both formal government institutions and a wider
array of nonprofit and private entities that shape the built
environment.15 The discipline of urban planning commonly views the
activity of “planning” broadly, synonymous with governance (rather

https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/redev-revital-recomm-9-27-06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2GBD-9WBA].
9.
See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 164–65 (“Every wicked problem is essentially
unique,” which means that “despite long lists of similarities between a current problem
and a previous one, there always might be an additional distinguishing property that is of
overriding importance.”).
10. Id. at 164–66.
11. See Yoav Hagler, Defining U.S. Megaregions, AMERICA 2050, Nov. 2009, at 1, 1.
12. Scott Campbell, The Imperative of Growth, the Rhetoric of Sustainability: The Divergence
of the Ecoregion and the Global Megaregion, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL
COMPETITIVENESS 127, 127 (Catherine L. Ross ed., 2009).
13. Id. at 128, 132.
14. Id. at 132–33.
15. Nuno F. da Cruz, Philipp Rode & Michael McQuarrie, New Urban Governance: A Review
of Current Themes and Future Priorities, 41 J. URB. AFFS. 1, 2 (2019); see also Peter Schmitt &
Thorsten Wiechmann, Unpacking Spatial Planning as the Governance of Place, 54 DISP – PLAN.
REV. 21, 25 (2019).
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than an old-school, narrower view of planning as simply the drafting of
land use plans).16 If planners face three stages to engage complexity and
sustainability (acknowledgment, analysis, intervention), governance
(intervention) is the most challenging step,17 as highlighted in Table 1.
Traditional urban planning is rooted in the logic of technical rationality,
including the effective translation of community knowledge and
interests into goals and policies, and in the ability to connect past
events, present patterns, and future trends.18 Yet with wicked
problems, this rational planning model encounters complexity,
uncertainty, and an intractable lack of convergence of interests.
Overcoming these obstacles is a formidable task, accomplished neither
through a rhetorical sleight of hand nor the panacea of new data
technologies. Using our two examples, we explore how planners and
stakeholders can address these complex challenges.
TABLE 1: GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES POSED BY
COMPLEX, WICKED PROBLEMS
Traditional governance
requires...

But in cases of socioenvironmental wicked
problems...

Shared definition of the problem
and need for intervention

Little consensus about the problem
and the pathway to solutions

Knowledge of cause-effect
and consequences

Feedbacks and interactions
(complexity) make it difficult to keep
track of causes and effects

Identification of key parties
and interests

Interests, preferences, and
authority/ability to act are diverse

Ability to imagine multiple
interventions and evaluate and
compare each

Existing tools do not match the need
to balance rigor with accessibility,
individual/local goals with
collective/regional goals

Strategic knowledge of the scope
and limits of public power
and authority

Incentives for individual/short-term
gains and uncertainty about
regional/long-term effects are high

16. da Cruz et al., supra note 15, at 2.
17. See infra Table 1 (explaining governance challenges posed by complexity and
sustainability).
18. See, e.g., Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 156–57 (“Goal Formulation”).
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I. HOW DO PLANNERS THINK ABOUT COMPLEXITY
AND WICKED PROBLEMS?
Urban and regional planners invariably engage with contested,
messy urban challenges. Urban systems have distinctive
characteristics that shape how planners approach complex governance
challenges.19 Here are six:
1. Cities are both complicated, with many moving parts
and stakeholders, and complex, due to the dynamics of
surprising emergence.20
2. Cities are interactive, with virtuous and vicious cycles of
growth and decline that undermine the possibility
of equilibrium.21
3. Cities are internally heterogeneous and uneven, where
specialization and spatial and social divisions of labor tend
to increase with city size.22
4. Cities tend to spatially concentrate all sorts of social
phenomena (both good and ill): people, power, capital,
information,
pollution,
viruses,
culture,
crime,
and innovation.
5. Cities are adaptive, open social-technological-environmental
systems.23
6. Cities are resistant to universal laws. Despite efforts to the
contrary, there is no singular, stable, ideal form, size,
density, shape, or design of a city.24
Overall, despite the influence of path dependency in a city’s
historical development, one cannot always anticipate the outcomes
based on the characteristics of the starting conditions.25 You have to run
the model, or let history (and urbanization) run its course, to see what
19. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259 (discussing
characteristics of urban systems).
20. See Jo da Silva, Sam Kernaghan & Andrés Luque, A Systems Approach to Meeting the
Challenges of Urban Climate Change, 4 INT’L J. URB. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 125, 129 (2012)
(advocating for a “systems thinking” approach that considers cities “as complex ‘living’ systems
undergoing numerous dynamic changes at any given time, constantly evolving and responding to
both internal interactions and the influence of external factors”).
21. Id. at 128.
22. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 167 (“[T]he high-scale societies of the Western world
are becoming increasingly heterogeneous.”).
23. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259.
24. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 165 (“In the more complex world of social policy
planning, every situation is likely to be one-of-a-kind.”).
25. Id. at 164.
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emerges. From simple starting conditions emerge complex, varied, and
surprising outcomes. Yes, it is tempting, in retrospect, to narrate a
clear, deterministic line from a city’s past to its present and to
construct universal laws of urbanization, but these laws are
invariably unreliable.
These characteristics create a paradox for the planning
profession: cities both need and resist planning and regulation. Rather
than strive for optimal efficiency and definitive solutions, planners
must typically content themselves with compromise, partial answers,
and the comfort of incremental improvements. Because cities are
dynamic, volatile, and unpredictable, they elude tidy, technical
solutions.26 The term “planning” may suggest the calm, rational, and
technical preparation of ideal blueprints for the good city (and this task
does remain part of the job). Yet much of a planner’s professional day
involves mediating, listening to impatient stakeholders who are
skeptical of public planning and regulation, negotiating conflict,
interpreting city codes, scrounging for limited funds, and leveraging
limited resources to make a difference.27 Planning attracts pragmatic
idealists who believe in promoting the public interest through
improving the built environment. It is not a professional activity for
those who need certainty, unquestioned authority, quick answers,
or perfection.
It should not be surprising, then, that two urbanists developed
the idea of the wicked problem.28 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber
developed this concept at Berkeley during a highly productive, but
lively and tempestuous, era of urban scholarship, and perhaps the era’s
two dynamics are connected. There were two colliding impulses. The
first was planning’s push to gain new scholarly rigor and scientific
authority in academic and policy circles. Planning scholarship had
sought academic legitimacy through embracing quantitative methods,
rational problem-solving, and large-scale modelling, in part to emulate
the more established disciplines on campus. In his writing, Webber was
promoting a broader vision of planning as a process of decisionmaking.29
He pushed against the perception, on campus and beyond, that
26. See id. at 160, 165 (“In the . . . complex world of social policy planning, every situation is
likely to be one-of-a-kind.”); da Silva et al., supra note 20, at 129.
27. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259.
28. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1.
29. Melvin M. Webber, The Prospects for Policies Planning, in THE URBAN CONDITION:
PEOPLE AND POLICY IN THE METROPOLIS 319, 320 (1963) (“[P]lanning is that process of making
rational decisions about future goals and future courses of action which relies upon explicit
tracings of the repercussions and of the value implications associated with alternative courses of
actions, and, in turn, requires explicit evaluation and choice among the alternative matching
goal-action.”).
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planning was a “minor profession,” inhibited by its focus on practical
skills and municipal land use regulations. This effort would only be
partly successful, as planning could not fully assimilate into an “applied
social science” and the scientific basis sought was being attacked by the
anti-professionalism and anti-expertise of the time.30
The second impulse was from the streets. Many American cities
reached their peak population in 1950 and, by the early 1970s, were
tumbling in downward spirals of inner-city decline, white flight, racism,
urban poverty, inequality, deindustrialization, declining schools and
public services, and urban violence.31 Those who came of age only in the
twenty-first century—when cities were celebrated as the lively centers
of the high-tech information age (with its creative class and urban
triumphalism), and the dominant worries were gentrification and
congestion—may struggle to fully appreciate the sense of despair,
bewilderment, and desperation in many American cities during the
1960s and 1970s.32 And here was this relatively new field of urban
planning that could not “solve” wicked problems in the conventional
deterministic sense. Technocratic optimism, scientific modeling, and
modernist urban renewal agendas seemed ineffective in the efforts to
reverse this urban decline.33
Rittel and Webber articulated the concept of “wicked problems”
during this tumultuous period of social and scientific upheaval. In doing
so, they provided an alternative explanation of planning’s apparent
inability to “solve” the urban crisis.34 The deficiency was not that
planners lacked the intelligence, methodological skills, or scientific
rigor to solve urban problems. Instead, the difficulty lay in the nature
of planning problems themselves. As the pair explained, “We shall want
to suggest that the social professions were misled somewhere along the
line into assuming they could be applied scientists—that they could
solve problems in the ways scientists can solve their sorts of problems.
The error has been a serious one.” 35 Planners’ reinterpretation of the
field’s crisis was a somber recognition that urban planning faced an
unruly collection of intractable challenges. But it was also a reassuring
30. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 156–57 (discussing the anti-professionalism
movement’s opposition to the field of planning).
31. BRENT D. RYAN, DESIGN AFTER DECLINE: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS SHRINKING CITIES 37–
38 (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2012) (discussing the catastrophic changes in and
declining population of major U.S. cities in the second half of the twentieth century).
32. See id.
33. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259 (discussing
the frustrations of early planners in applying rational quantitative modeling to
planning problems).
34. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1.
35. Id. at 160.
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argument: the criticisms of the planning profession as underdeveloped
and ineffective were misplaced. One should not mechanistically and
inappropriately apply the scientific standards from the natural sciences
and engineering to social policy. The article suggested an alternative
tactic: recognizing wicked problems would lead planners to strategically
reorient their problem-solving methods.36
In the nearly fifty years since Rittel and Webber’s work, both
planning’s theoretical culture and the nature of urban problems have
profoundly changed.37 But wicked problems are as relevant now as
then. The field now uses the “wicked problem” moniker in response to
an era of megacities, globalization, climate change, terrorism,
sustainability, and Habermasian communicative action.38 The
relationship between science and planning has also changed. In the
1970s, planners experienced the frustration of translating technological
and scientific progress into social planning and policy.39 Today,
expectations about science and urban planning are more nuanced if not
contradictory. Some planners have embraced a qualitative, narrative
approach to planning as discursive collaboration among a pluralistic
public in pursuit of democracy and social justice.40 Others have
embraced urban informatics, geographic information systems (“GIS”),
spatial analysis, “big data,” and quantitative evaluation.41 Planners
therefore acknowledge the persistent role of wicked problems in their
work yet seek divergent strategies—both discursive and technical—to
alternatively accommodate, tame, or overcome these wicked problems.
There is a risk of overusing the term “wicked problem,” and one
should be wary of the casual, imprecise use of the term in the literature.
Authors frequently use the term when they really just want to describe
a hard, difficult problem that has led to a lot of controversy and
conflict.42 One is well advised to return to the source and review Rittel
and Webber’s original list of ten characteristics of wicked problems.43

36. Id.
37. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 262–63.
38. See, e.g., FRANK P. I NCROPERA, CLIMATE CHANGE: A WICKED PROBLEM (2015); C. Jotin
Khisty & Steen Leleur, Citizen Participation Through Communicative Action Towards a New
Framework and Synthesis, 31 J. ADVANCED TRANSP. 119, 129–30 (1997) (analyzing a case study
for applying the Habermas communicative theory to a “wicked problem”).
39. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 262.
40. See Ralf Brand & Frank Gaffikinn, Collaborative Planning in an Uncollaborative World,
6 PLAN. THEORY 282, 291–92 (2007) (examining how collaborative planning can take place in a
pluralist society to promote democracy and social justice).
41. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 267.
42. See id. at 262; John C. Camillus, Strategy as a Wicked Problem, HARV. BUS. REV., May
2008, at 98, 100 (explaining what makes a wicked problem different from ordinary problems).
43. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 161–67.
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This misuse is similar to the misplaced use of the term “complex” when
a situation or system is merely complicated.
Our own research explores the confluence of wicked problems
and complex systems. 44 Both approaches view the urban world as
diverse, pluralistic, and dynamic—a world ill-suited to traditional
optimization and equilibrium modeling.45 We observe that the complex
systems underlying human settlements (encompassing their social,
biological, and built infrastructure) generate wicked problems through
interactions, heterogeneity, feedback, neighborhood effects, and
tensions between individual and collective interests. 46 Conversely,
planning can use the tools of complex systems to mitigate and adapt to
these wicked problems in ways that traditional, mechanistic planning
tools cannot.47 As such, wicked problems come full circle: complexity is
both the source of intractable wicked problems and a way to trace the
pathway out.
We view complex systems as not simply a contemporary
synonym of wicked problems, but also a needed adaptation and
evolution of the 1970s wicked problem framework. This updating
reflects a generational shift in planning thought: today’s planners
approach complex problems with tools and cultural politics that would
often be unknown to planners in the 1970s. Indeed, the shift in planning
language from Rittel and Webber’s “wicked problems” to today’s
“complex systems” is a proxy of the larger changes in planning theory
over these fifty years.48 Planners define problems differently, temper
their belief in technical progress, and approach social justice, race,
gender, and environmentalism with more integrated strategies.49 We
have explained elsewhere:
Rittel and Webber were responding to a Cold-War overconfidence in the universal
applicability of scientific problem solving (and perhaps to the waning overconfidence in
American political-technical dominance). Today’s planning scholarship works in a more

44. See sources cited supra note 3.
45. See sources cited supra note 3.
46. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259, 261.
47. See id. at 262, 270 (discussing how tools like big data alone or “rational, quantitative,
comprehensive modeling” are ineffective for complex systems).
48. Compare Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 160 (framing planning issues as “wicked
problems”), with Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 262–63
(placing the discussion of planning and “wicked problems” within a “complex systems” framework).
49. See, e.g., Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 267
(“Technical fixes are not the way out of wicked problems without coordination and
collaboration . . . .”); id. at 262–63 (recharacterizing “wicked problems” as complex systems); Scott
D. Campbell, Sustainable Development and Social Justice: Conflicting Urgencies and the Search
for Common Ground in Urban and Regional Planning, 1 MICH. J. SUSTAINABILITY 75 (2013)
(examining urban planning’s simultaneous pursuit of both sustainability and social justice,
including racial and gender justice).
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bifurcated era . . . of healthy scientific skepticism (arising both from environmental and
community activism), troubling anti-science (e.g., right-wing attacks on climate change
modeling), and a new era of (over)confidence in information-age problem-solving (Big
Data, networking, personal device connectivity, GIS, the “Internet of Things,” and socalled “Smart Cities”).50

Complex systems cannot “solve” wicked problems in the
conventional, deterministic sense. But complex systems can help
redefine and unravel wicked problems while retaining their diversity,
interdependence, and “messiness.” Complex systems tools—such as
agent-based modeling, cellular automata, networks, and system
dynamics—cannot predict the future or determine a single, optimal
solution. They instead encourage both planners and citizens to explore
various future scenarios, while considering interactions, feedback loops,
social learning, and the emergence of innovative, new urban patterns
and behaviors.51 The very characteristics of wicked problems that trip
up traditional statistical and mathematical analysis become prolific
ingredients for complex systems analysis.
That said, the implementation of complex systems-based
planning strategies still lags far behind its potential. Planners are quick
to acknowledge complexity as a characteristic of cities but so far have
been slow to convert complex systems thinking into concrete planning
solutions.52 We observe three stages: (1) a general acknowledgment of
complexity as a characteristic; (2) analytically understanding the
complex workings of a system; and (3) engaging complexity as a
planning strategy.53
The first step is simply recognizing that urban systems are
complex. This is a vital but often vapid statement, since frequently
it is merely the observation that urban problems are
difficult, messy, and intractable. And imprecise observers too
casually conflate complicatedness (many variables, large scale,
long-term) with complexity (interaction, feedback, uncertainty,
adaptation, emergence).54
The second step is using complex systems reasoning and
analysis to get inside the system and understand its internal workings,
logic, and dynamics. This requires “thinking like an agent”: How do

50. Zellner & Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted Problems, supra note 3, at 459.
51. Id. at 461 (“Complex systems analysis cannot resolve these challenges of uneven political
power and resources. But complex systems tools can assist planners with other barriers to
implementing communicative action: scalability, multiple forms of knowledge, highly technical
information, long-term and cumulative impacts, and unintended consequences.”).
52. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 258–59 (“There
is an enduring gap between acknowledgement of complexity and harnessing complexity . . . .”).
53. See infra Table 2.
54. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259.
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agents (such as homeowners, employers, residents, commuters)
interact, learn, cooperate, compete, and adapt with other agents in the
system? What are the system-wide effects of the aggregation of
individual decisions?55
The third step is the hardest: moving from analysis to planning
practice. How does one incorporate complex systems thinking into the
open political world of public planning and urban development?
Strategies for this third step may be as varied as planning itself, such
as exploring and evaluating a set of alternative future scenarios,
visualizing the system-wide effects of a change in single or multiple
policies, and engaging diverse stakeholders at a public meeting in
complex systems thinking.56
We use this three-stage framework not only to suggest a
pathway for planners to sequentially engage complexity, but also to
explain why complexity has not been widely adopted in the profession.
Planners often get stuck in the first or second step. This disconnect
between description, explanation, and practical action is pervasive
throughout planning and other public policy professions, though the
complexity of urban systems makes this disjunction particularly acute.
II. HOW DO PLANNERS THINK ABOUT SUSTAINABILITY?
Planning has explicitly engaged sustainability since the 1980s,
with a growing emphasis since the 1990s.57 Frequently idealized, and
often contested, sustainability remains for urban planning a leitmotif,
core value, and go-to keyword. Alternately thoughtful and picayune
voices have bemoaned sustainability’s shortcomings: its vague vision of
the future, its dilution through overuse, and its deference to the status
quo and system maintenance. Critics have argued for the concept’s
dethroning, either by resilience, regenerative cultures, or
environmental justice. Yet sustainability retains its hold at the center
of the field.58
This recent focus on sustainability builds on a much longer
planning tradition of debating the broader tensions between
urbanization and environmentalism. Urban planning, as a modern

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., TIMOTHY BEATLEY & KRISTY MANNING, THE ECOLOGY OF PLACE: PLANNING FOR
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY, AND COMMUNITY (1997); William E. Rees, Defining “Sustainable
Development,” CHS RSCH. BULL., May 1989, at 1; SIM VAN DER RYN & PETER CALTHORPE,
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES: A NEW DESIGN SYNTHESIS FOR CITIES, SUBURBS AND TOWNS (1991).
58. See, e.g., Edward J. Jepson Jr., Planning and Sustainability, in URBAN PLANNING IN THE
21ST CENTURY 104–05 (2009) (discussing the centrality of sustainability to systems planning).
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profession, arose as a child of the Progressive Era at the end of the
nineteenth century, influenced by good government movements,
housing reform, the conservation movement, city beautification efforts,
and sanitary reform (especially efforts to provide clean water to cities).59
At its core, planning was a collective, reformist response to the rapid
urbanization of the industrial revolution and the massive conversion of
rural and small-town landscapes into dense urban centers.60 Managing
the relationship between town and countryside, and thus between
human economic activity and the natural environment, has long been a
central task of planning—a task recently practiced under the banner of
“sustainable development,” but one with a much longer history.
Sustainable planning is thus a hybrid: a composite of old and
new; of science and politics, technics and ideology; of homegrown,
planning-specific ideas and many borrowed concepts from other fields;
of analytical social critique, pre-industrial nostalgia, and lofty futuristic
aspirations. It builds on Progressive Era garden cities and conservation,
New Deal resource management, 1970s environmentalism and
bioregionalism, and twenty-first century environmental justice and
climate science.61 It draws heavily on broader sustainability
influences—from the Brundtland Report62 to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change63—while emphasizing the local governance
and spatial development dimensions. Sustainability’s emphasis on
intergenerational and intergroup equity and focus on the long-range
future in current decisionmaking resonate with urban planning’s core
values.64 This inclusive, composite nature of sustainability sometimes
leads to semantic frustration, but it has also created a dynamic,
evolving, and broadly supported agenda for planning.
Contemporary urban planning is the governance practice of
reconciling tensions between divergent stakeholders over the use of
space, whether zoning regulations, property rights, public space and
access, spillover effects, transportation mobility, infrastructure, and so
59. Susan S. Fainstein, Urban Planning, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (July 20, 1998),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/urban-planning/The-era-of-industrialization [https://perma.cc/
G5EB-Z2FF].
60. See id. (“Giant sprawling cities developed during this era . . . .”).
61. Campbell, supra note 49, at 77; see also Fainstein, supra note 59 (discussing how
Ebenezer Howard’s utopian concept of a garden city influenced the appearance of residential areas
in the United States).
62. See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter
Brundtland Report].
63. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR URBAN
POLICYMAKERS: WHAT THE IPCC REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5C MEANS FOR CITIES (2018).
64. Campbell, supra note 49, at 88 (“Sustainability also endures because it taps
into planning’s core ideas and values, and links well to other dominant themes in
contemporary planning . . . .”).
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on.65 In broad terms, planning manages tension between three core
impulses: economic development, environmental protection, and social
equity. We can call this triad the “planner’s triangle,”66 with
sustainability at its heart.67
Promoting the green, productive, and fair city is not a simple
task, yet it can be achieved through the engaged and persistent
negotiation for balance in three tensions: the resource conflict (between
environmental protection and economic development), the property
conflict (between economic development and social justice), and the
development conflict (between environmental protection and social
justice). These conflicts reflect the tensions intrinsic to urban societies.
FIGURE 1: THE PLANNER’S TRIANGLE68

The resolution of each of these three conflicts requires
institutional frameworks (legal, regulatory, market-based, political).
65. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259 (positing
that employing complexity as a planning strategy requires engaging diverse stakeholders in
complex systems thinking that involves trade-offs).
66. See infra Figure 1 (The Planner’s Triangle).
67. Scott Campbell, Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities? Urban Planning and the
Contradictions of Sustainable Development, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N, 29, 298, 301–05 (1996)
[hereinafter Campbell, Green Cities]; Scott D. Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited:
Sustainability and the Evolution of a Planning Ideal That Can’t Stand Still, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N
388, 389 (2016) [hereinafter Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited].
68. This version of the Planner’s Triangle has been revised and updated. Compare Campbell,
The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 389, with Campbell, Green Cities, supra note
67, at 298.
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This leads to a distinctive history of governance for each conflict. The
first conflict to be formally engaged was the property conflict, through
the incremental construction of the modern social welfare state (e.g.,
the 1880s in Germany, the beginning of the twentieth century in the
United Kingdom, the 1930s in the United States).69 The state stepped
in to address tensions between the interests of economic development
(e.g., industrial capital) and social justice (e.g., labor unions, housing
advocates) in an era of rapid urban industrialization. The broader
institutions to engage these property conflicts are thus well established,
both at the national and local levels, notwithstanding recent neoliberal
austerity pushbacks. The resource conflict led to more recent elaborate
institutions of environmental regulation and resource management.70
Like the social welfare state, these arrangements vary widely by state
and nation, are often woefully insufficient, and are challenged by
political opposition, yet nevertheless remain “richly embedded in the
institutions of the modern state and in the practices of planning.”71 The
development conflict, unlike the prior two conflicts, lacks a stable and
consensus governance framework:
By contrast, there is arguably no corresponding set of established, robust institutions to
manage the development conflict, either internationally or domestically. Environmental
justice (EJ) may be a rich area of scholarship and community organizing (such as
community benefits agreements), but it remains otherwise underdeveloped and not
adequately embedded in institutional practices and regulation (despite the existence, for
example, of a modest-sized EPA program on EJ).72

The Planner’s Triangle has been appealing for both its simplicity
and its depth: a simplicity that is stable and a depth that allows for a
dynamic interplay between persistence and fragility, the kind of
creative destruction that C.S. Holling, Lance Gunderson, Gary
Peterson, and other scholars draw from to describe resilient systems.73
Although many have envisioned sustainable development as a win-win
outcome to enable continued growth without environmental costs, the
model’s focus on reconciling three conflicts suggested a more realistic
view of the inevitability of trade-offs in a finite world.74 Sustainability
at the center of this triangle meant, perhaps, the realization of it as an
69. See Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 389.
70. Id. at 392; see also Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67, at 299 (highlighting the
resource management aspect through the example of timber yields).
71. Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 392.
72. Id.; see also Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67, at 309 (arguing for an expansion in
joint tasks like public-private partnerships).
73. C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Garry D. Peterson, Sustainability and Panarchies,
in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 63, 72–74
(C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson eds., 2002).
74. Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 396.
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elusive, moving target. While impossible to reach, it is the process of
attempting sustainability through a purposeful planning practice that
can allow us to, at the very least, bring these tensions to the forefront,
make them visible, and negotiate them, which is better than the
alternative of assuming these conflicts away.75
Urban planners have thus embraced the vision and ideology of
sustainability as a central organizing principle for their discipline. But
how well have planners integrated sustainability into planning practice
and translated these ideals into outcomes measured by environmental
quality and improved public health? Twenty years ago, Phil Berke and
Maria Conroy evaluated thirty comprehensive plans to assess how well
cities were planning for sustainable development.76 They found no
major differences between plans that explicitly and intentionally
incorporated sustainability principles and those that did not.77 The
former tended to emphasize only some principles, particularly the
livable built environment, but did not offer a balanced approach among
all the others identified.78 Very little attention was given to the polluter
pay principle and the responsible regionalism principle, since these
would require major institutional and political changes that in the
United States, at least, are not widely supported by powerful sectors of
society.79 A survey of medium and large cities found that cities were not
systematic in their adoption of sustainability initiatives, and there was
little evidence of a broader commitment in terms of specific
sustainability plans and sustainability positions.80 More recently, Liao
et al. built on a longitudinal national data set of local plans for
sustainability between 2010 and 2015 to study the relationship between
planning and implementation of sustainability strategies, looking at
both places where sustainability was explicitly a goal of local plans and
places where it was not.81 While having plans in place was found to be
correlated with higher levels of action, that effect tended to be shortlived.82 Both resource availability and commitment and citizen

75. Id.
76. Philip R. Berke & Maria Manta Conroy, Are We Planning for Sustainable Development?
An Evaluation of 30 Comprehensive Plans, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 21 (2000).
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id. at 27.
79. Id. at 29–30.
80. Devashree Saha & Robert G. Paterson, Local Government Efforts to Promote the “Three
Es” of Sustainable Development: Survey in Medium to Large Cities in the United States, 28 J. PLAN.
EDUC. & RSCH. 21, 28 (2008).
81. Lu Liao, Mildred E. Warner & George C. Homsy, When Do Plans Matter? Tracking
Changes in Local Government Sustainability Actions from 2010 to 2015, 86 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N
60 (2020).
82. Id. at 68.
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participation also increased action.83 This trend is confirmed by a
survey administered in 2015 in which many respondents considered
environmental protection a priority, though only a third reported
adoption in planning documents.84 Moreover, economic factors and
priorities compete with sustainability goals and present an obstacle
to sustainability planning in the form of financial constraints
for implementation.85
The above assessment underlines the highly varied levels of
engagement with sustainability. We identify three levels, which
parallel the three stages we identified in working with complexity
(acknowledgement, analysis, implementation).86 That is, planners face
three questions in confronting sustainability: (1) What is wrong with
the current situation? (2) How did our history of urbanization (and our
approach to using environmental resources to build and run cities) lead
to this crisis? (3) What is to be done?
The first stage is the acknowledgment of the current
environmental crisis: to use the concept of unsustainability to
reinterpret environmental impacts with an emphasis on rates of
resource depletion and regeneration, and thus the threat to the longterm viability of natural systems.87 The Brundtland Report codified and
elevated this framework of recognizing the tensions among economic
development, environment protection, and addressing the needs of the
poor in undeveloped communities. 88 Sustainability becomes both a
metric to identify the environmental costs of current practices and an
aspirational goal for the future.
The second stage is to decipher the underlying causes of this
crisis: to advance beyond seeing unsustainability as a general symptom
and develop a systemic diagnosis of our unsustainable cities and their
structural dynamics.89 This incorporates in-depth analysis by building
on a scientific understanding of socio-ecological systems and their
feedback mechanisms. This is a challenging task since it involves not
just the detailed understanding of multiple systems (nature, the
economy, cities, politics), each with their own methods and logic, but
83. Id. at 69.
84. ICMA, SUSTAINABLE CMTYS. DIV. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N., SMALL TOWN & RURAL PLAN.
DIVS. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N, BINGHAMTON UNIV., CORNELL UNIV. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUSTAINABILITY PRACTICES, 2015 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2016),
https://icma.org/sites/default/files/308135_2015%20Sustainability%20Survey%20Report%20Final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR7T-4T7F].
85. Id.
86. See infra Table 2.
87. See infra Table 2 (Stage 1: Acknowledgement).
88. Brundtland Report, supra note 62, at 5–6.
89. See infra Table 2 (Stage 2: Analysis).
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also understanding how these various systems interact and collide.90
This is where we observe planning lagging, as the field is not
particularly strong in providing the training required to build on this
understanding to then propose appropriate planning strategies (the
next phase, below).
The third stage is to develop planning strategies to steer these
systems into more sustainable outcomes.91 Beyond knowledge of
technology, design, and future scenarios modeling, this involves the
ability to translate plans into effective policy and find ways to leverage
resources and political alliances to overcome opposition and get these
plans implemented. This also necessitates the participation of diverse
stakeholders, as trade-offs are inevitable and must be negotiated. Given
the lack of training required to better understand socio-ecological
systems and, with that understanding, support the design of effective
planning strategies, sustainability is incorporated as a concept in
planning documents, but it does not always lead to progress in the
fundamental approach to planning.92 Planning as a field is not
sufficiently contributing to generating alternative solutions. Table 2
below summarizes the three stages (acknowledgement, analysis, and
implementation) as they relate to both complexity and sustainability.

90. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259–60.
91. See infra Table 2 (Stage 3: Implementation (Governance)).
92. See, e.g., Liao et al., supra note 81, at 71 (“A more comprehensive and integrative set of
considerations may be required to encourage continued increase in local government sustainability
efforts in the long run . . . .”).
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TABLE 2: THREE STAGES OF ENGAGING COMPLEXITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY IN URBAN SYSTEMS
Stage 1:

Stage 2:

Stage 3:

Acknowledgment

Analysis

Implementation
(Governance)

Sustainability

Recognition of the

Understanding of

Converting this

costs of

unsustainability as

analytical knowledge into

environmental

the product of socio-

policy & practice to

damage and the long-

technological-

manage conflicting trade-

term unviability of

ecological systems

offs and transform the

the status-quo

(mass urbanization)

functioning of the urban

Unsustainability as a

An analytical

(may include SES

symptom

diagnosis of the

modeling; participatory

underlying causes

modeling)

environmental system

and dynamics of
unsustainable

Sustainability as a

practices

planning strategy

Sustainability as an
analytical method
Complexity

A view from outside

Understanding

Moving from analytical

looking in

complexity from the

observation to practice

inside
Treats complexity as
a black box

Using participatory
Using complex

modeling to connect

systems reasoning

interventions with

and analysis

plausible outcomes

(without advancing

Encourages

Complexity as a strategy

beyond that general

“thinking like an

observation)

agent”—

Statements such as
“cities are complex!”

understanding the
Complexity as a

logic of agent based

symptom

modeling (“ABM”)
Complexity as a
dynamic
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III. THE CONUNDRUM OF RECONCILING GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY
Urban planning’s engagement with sustainability would
arguably be far easier—and more straightforward—if the field’s sole
responsibility was to design and manage cities to protect the natural
environment. The profession would single-mindedly promote the strict
regulation of new construction, discourage private auto and air travel,
tightly regulate polluting industries and infrastructures, and mandate
smaller housing units to be clustered near urban centers with strict
open space preservation beyond city limits. But urban planning has a
much broader professional portfolio: promoting vibrant local economies
and strong fiscal revenues with expanding job markets, advocating for
the needs of the poor and marginalized, as well as fostering healthy
living conditions and good urban design.93 These divergent priorities
pull planners in competing directions.94 The result is an ambivalent
relationship towards growth of cities, land consumption, housing,
employment, natural resource consumption, and GDP.
There is a long tradition in planning of resisting excessive
growth and mitigating the negative impacts of such growth.95 And yet
urban planning is an arm of local government, which has many strong
motives to promote growth—increase tax revenues, improve public
services, promote real estate and construction sectors, and strengthen
political power—and many dire examples of the social and political
costs of urban decline.96 The critical social geographer David Harvey
astutely observed this seemingly unavoidable professional mandate:
[T]he planner’s task is to contribute to the processes of social reproduction and that in so
doing the planner is equipped with powers vis-à-vis the production, maintenance, and
management of the built environment which permit him or her to intervene in order to
stabilize, to create the conditions for “balanced growth” . . . .97

Planning’s conflicted stance toward growth in turn leads to a
complex and often convoluted approach to sustainability: the profession
overtly professes a loyal commitment to environmental stewardship but
has a tacit growth imperative. And this intrinsic contradiction creates
93. See Nikil Saval, The Plight of the Urban Planner, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/the-plight-of-the-urban-planner
[https://perma.cc/4R5E-MMVL].
94. See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Planner’s Triangle).
95. See, e.g., George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to Growth Management: Vermont, Oregon, and
a Synthesis, 10 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 13 (1996) (detailing the history of incentives and problems with
rapid urban growth and attempted state regulatory solutions).
96. See Brent T. White, Simone M. Sepe & Saura Masconale, Urban Decay, Austerity, and the
Rule of Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2014) (highlighting issues facing cities like Detroit and Baltimore).
97. DAVID HARVEY, THE URBANIZATION OF CAPITAL: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
CAPITALIST URBANIZATION 175 (1985).
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a stubborn impediment to progressing beyond the first stage of
sustainability (acknowledgement) through the second (analysis) and to
the third (implementation).98 For some planners, this barrier takes the
form of a general lack of understanding—or outright denial—of the
existence of biophysical limits to unlimited growth that is embedded in
most planning efforts.99 For expanding cities, this growth is often a
given. For struggling cities, it is an unquestioned (though often elusive)
aspiration. Not growing is often interpreted not just as decline, but as
failure, something to avoid at all costs. In recent years the degrowth
movement has emerged, but has nevertheless been met with significant
skepticism and remains more central to activism—and stronger in
Europe than in the United States—than to planning scholarship or
practice.100 Before the degrowth movement, “shrinking cities” was a
relatively marginal interest in planning, but whose focus remained the
management of decline, a resignation after population is already lost,
most certainly not an aspiration or a planned strategy ahead of
depopulation.101 We still use “housing starts,” new building permits,
construction employment, traffic volume, retail expansion, and GDP
growth as markers of a healthy economy.
The landmark Brundtland Report revealed this conflicting role
of growth as both exacerbating environmental degradation and
bringing millions out of poverty:
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable—to ensure that it meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. The concept of sustainable development does imply limits—not absolute limits
but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on
environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human
activities. But technology and social organization can be both managed and improved to
make way for a new era of economic growth. 102

98. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259–60 (identifying
and explaining “three stages: (1) external acknowledgement of complexity; (2) understanding
complexity from the inside; and (3) engaging complexity as a planning strategy”).
99. William E. Rees, Cities as Dissipative Structures: Global Change and the Vulnerability of
Urban Civilization, in SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE: THE EMERGING PARADIGM AND THE URBAN
ENVIRONMENT 247, 249 (M.P. Weinstein & R.E. Turner eds., 2012) (“The growth-oriented beliefs,
values, and assumptions underpinning contemporary economic models and consequential
‘environmental’ behavior are fundamentally at odds with the biophysical laws and dynamics
governing vital ecosystems and geophysical systems.”).
100. Ari Aukusti Lehtinen, Degrowth in City Planning, 196 FENNIA 43, 44 (2018); François
Schneider, Housing for Degrowth Narratives, in HOUSING FOR DEGROWTH: PRINCIPLES, MODELS,
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 14, 14 (Anitra Nelson & François Schneider eds., 2019).
101. Justin B. Hollander, Karina M. Pallagst, Terry Schwarz & Frank J. Popper, Planning
Shrinking Cities, 72 PROGRESS PLAN. 223, 223–24 (2009); RYAN, supra note 31, at 20–22; Brent D.
Ryan & Shuqi Gao, Plan Implementation Challenges in a Shrinking City: A Conformance
Evaluation of Youngstown’s (OH) Comprehensive Plan with a Subsequent Zoning Code, 85 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 424 (2019).
102. Brundtland Report, supra note 62, at 8.
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The Commission dances a contradictory pas de deux around the issue
of growth—both acknowledging the present-day need for limits but also
diplomatically presuming that future generations will behave better
and manage growth and technology in more responsible ways than past
generations have.
The urgent challenge, then, is to find an alternative to the
strategy of growing our way out of social inequality. We will have to
come to terms with what all systems scientists know full well: unlimited
growth is not possible in a finite world.103 There is no such thing as
sustainable growth.104 Growth, paradoxically, leads to collapse. Our
regional and global resource systems are already following that
trajectory.105 An alluring solution would be to promote sustainability by
curbing growth, and indeed some economists 106 and systems thinkers107
have long argued for steady state economics. It is an appealing vision of
sustainability: a future where human development is driven not by the
expansion of material consumption of goods and natural resources, but
rather by the intensification and refinement of non-material
development (in the arts, education, culture, social capital). Why, then,
are these no-growth arguments (of decoupling social progress from
resource exploitation) commonly dismissed or ignored? Society has
developed a long-running habit of relying on the paradigm of growth as
an expedient solution to social problems.108 If social strife chronically
arises from conflicts over limited and unequal access to property (land,
housing, food, resources, capital), then society has habitually sought to

103. DONELLA H. MEADOWS, DENNIS L. MEADOWS, JØRGEN RANDERS & WILLIAM W. BEHRENS
III, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF ROME’S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT
OF MANKIND 178–79 (1972).
104. Moira Zellner, It Is Easier to Be Smart Than to Be Green, in REMAKING THE URBAN SOCIAL
CONTRACT: HEALTH, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 87, 89 (Michael A. Pagano ed., 2016).
105. Graham M. Turner, A Comparison of The Limits of Growth with 30 Years of Reality, 18
GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 397, 400; Graham M. Turner, On the Cusp of Global Collapse? Updated
Comparison of The Limits of Growth with Historical Data, 21 GAIA: ECOLOGICAL PERSPS. FOR SCI.
& SOC’Y 116, 120–21 (2012).
106. HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY STATE ECONOMICS (2d. ed. 1991); HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B.
COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE
ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1989).
107. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 103, at 156–61.
108. William E. Rees, Globalization and Sustainability: Conflict or Convergence?, 22 BULL.
SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 249, 251 (2002):
All major national governments and mainstream international agencies are united in
a vision of global development and poverty alleviation centered on unlimited economic
expansion fueled by open markets and more liberalized trade. At the heart of this
expansionist vision (the “dominant economic paradigm”) is the belief that human
welfare can all but be equated with ever-increasing material well-being
(income growth).
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dampen these structural tensions (i.e., “property conflicts”109) by
expanding the aggregate supply of property.110 Promoting more
equitable resource distribution has long been seen as more politically
acceptable (and less threatening) to elites in times of expanding GDP
rather than in times of stagnation.111 Crises of capital accumulation can
be “fixed”—at least temporarily—through spatial expansion of local and
regional economies.112 Although systems thinking and natural sciences
understand the inherent limits of a world with finite resources,
business sectors continue arguing for never-ending economic expansion
and supply oriented solutions. This perspective is reinforced by intense
lobbying of political leaders and reliance on flawed and misleading
theories (e.g., growth as a recipe to address all social ills, technological
innovation as a way out of all the problems caused by growth) and
metrics of success (e.g., GDP).113 Growth does not solve these crises, but
merely postpones them—yet promoting growth has been an appealing
strategy of “kicking the can down the road.” Growth has become a
politically expedient addiction that is stubbornly hard to kick.
The governance path to urban sustainability is thus not through
the avoidance of but rather through the direct engagement with core
tensions in society. These tensions are also intrinsically embedded
within the disciplinary tradition of urban planning. The field has two
seemingly contradictory impulses. Often in the name of sustainability,
planners emphasize “urban growth boundaries, sustainable
development, ‘small is beautiful,’ and reducing our ecological footprint
to mitigate the downsides of excessive materialism.”114 Yet the
profession also promotes expansion through “urban growth coalitions,
the expansion of jobs and tax revenues, the construction of
infrastructure, and the push for more intensive land uses.” 115 Although
this tension is not a new development in planning, it has renewed
exigency in an era of climate change and massive global urbanization.
As a result, the marriage of sustainability and urban planning is not
without internal strife.

109. See supra Figure 1 (placing “property conflict” between the planner’s goals of “economic
development” and “equity [and] social justice”).
110. Rees, supra note 108, at 251.
111. See id. at 255–56 (detailing the inverse of this theory where under-developed and low
GDP countries are least likely to see equitable wealth distribution).
112. DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY 246 (2001)
(“Geographical expansion and geographical concentration are both to be regarded as the product
of the same striving to create new opportunities for capital accumulation.”).
113. Rees, supra note 108, at 251.
114. Campbell, supra note 12, at 131.
115. Id.
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This paradox between growth and conservation manifests itself
in multiple contemporary planning situations. We will illustrate this
paradox in this Article’s two case studies: ecogentrification and
megaregional sustainability. For ecogentrification, it is the collision
between sustainability’s call for urban living with a more modest
ecological footprint and the persistent push (by urban residents, real
estate developers, etc.) to improve urban living conditions and extract
more value from property through more intensive use of land, more
intensive up-zoning, and more intensive consumer activity.116
Ecogentrification then becomes a form of green conspicuous
consumption—a commodification of sustainability that belies a growthoriented urbanization impulse and undermines efforts to live more
modestly on the land. For megaregional sustainability, this new
supersized territorial system offers the promise of coordinated,
ecoregional management of water, land, food, and energy systems along
principles of integrated sustainability.117 But too often, these
megaregions and their emergent governance coalitions promote
regional economic growth over conservation, as these large urban
settlements aggressively sprawl out and convert farmland and
wilderness into exurbia, edge city office parks and “rural industrial”
landscapes.118 Complex systems thinking may suggest ways out of
this paradox.
A. Case 1: Ecogentrification
We
selected
“ecogentrification,”
or
“environmental
gentrification,” as a timely case study of complex, wicked problems
because it conjoins several present-day urban disputes:
unsustainability, housing unaffordability and displacement, and
growing inequality and segregation.119 Ecogentrification is therefore a
portmanteau of two ongoing planning challenges: the unsustainability
of human settlements and the growing inequality that expresses itself
spatially in housing markets. Both issues individually have long
histories. The Berlin-born, U.K.-based sociologist Ruth Glass first spoke
of “gentrification” in 1964 to describe the movement of affluent new
classes into formerly working-class neighborhoods of an increasingly
116. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 147.
117. Campbell, supra note 12, at 128.
118. See id. at 132–33.
119. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 146–47 (“The term has since been more widely deployed to
describe the vicious cycle of economic disinvestment and environmental degradation that devalues
urban space, followed by subsequent reinvestment and environmental remediation that increases
property values and displaces exiting residents.”).
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affluent postwar London. 120 The term eventually spread to the United
States and elsewhere to describe the process of urban revitalization
(often accompanied by displacement) in post-industrial cities.121 The
idea of the ecological city has an even longer and more varied history
(and many names), from early Progressive Era conservationist and
preservationist movements, through the environmentalism of the
1970s, sustainability of the 1980s (and beyond), and now climate
adaptation and mitigation.122 But we are only recently witnessing the
interaction of these two ideologies and strategies.
What motivated the creation of this new, hybrid term? For
skeptics, the rise of ecogentrification represents a hijacked and
corrupted version of sustainable development in an increasingly
privatized, polarized, and post-Keynesian society.123 It portends the
shift away from an egalitarian, public vision of sustainable cities with
universal public infrastructure and public goods, including
environmental quality.124 Rather than a society-wide strategy towards
sustainability for all, we will instead see increased efforts among those
with resources and power to promote and occupy green islands of high
environmental quality (masquerading as sustainable communities).125
For lower-income communities fighting for less pollution, it often means
being displaced by higher rents and property taxes after the
environmental
improvements are made.126
Ecogentrification
may represent a new variant of environmental injustice or
environmental racism.127

120. RUTH GLASS, LONDON: ASPECTS OF CHANGE, at xviii–xix (1964).
121. See, e.g., Melissa Checker, Wiped Out by the “Greenwave”: Environmental Gentrification
and the Paradoxical Politics of Urban Sustainability, 23 CITY & SOC’Y 210, 212 (“On one hand, I
argue that [environmental gentrification] marks a recent iteration of old discourses about urban
reform, renewal and revitalization, which similarly masked inequitable urban development.”).
122. See id. at 215–16 (“The linking of ecological benefits to social uplift goes back to the turn
of the 20th century.”); Rice et al., supra note 7, at 150–51 (describing “the rise of environmentally
minded professional[s]” who “exhibit a strong desire to live an eco-friendly urban lifestyle”).
123. See Rice et al., supra note 7, at 146–47 (detailing the “failure” of New York City’s High
Line Park, which quickly became a tourist destination and source of increased property values).
124. Id. at 159–60.
125. Isabelle Anguelovski, James J.T. Connolly, Hamil Pearsall, Galia Shokry, Melissa
Checker, Juliana Maantay, Kenneth Gould, Tammy Lewis, Andrew Maroko & J. Timmons
Roberts, Why Green “Climate Gentrification” Threatens Poor and Vulnerable Populations, 116
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 26139, 26139 (2019).
126. Juliana A. Maantay & Andrew R. Maroko, Brownfields to Greenfields: Environmental
Justice Versus Environmental Gentrification, 15 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 2233, 2244
(2018) (“Green gentrification has implications for environmental justice because existing lowerincome residents are likely to be displaced after their community is improved environmentally.”).
127. Jennifer R. Wolch, Jason Byrne & Joshua P. Newell, Urban Green Space, Public Health,
and Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Making Cities ‘Just Green Enough,’ 125 LANDSCAPE
& URB. PLAN. 234, 236–37 (2014).
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Yet, there is no consensus that “ecogentrification” is necessarily
a negative process or that the term itself is even an accurate diagnosis.
More upbeat urban observers see it as a generally positive merging of
urban revitalization and sustainability strategies, including urban
greening, transit-oriented development, and an emphasis on walkable
and bikeable communities.128 This compound neologism has tricky
normative reverberations: the prefix “eco” generally suggests warm,
positive, and publicly minded connotations, while “gentrification”
typically—perhaps unfairly—has negative connotations as a proxy and
scapegoat for inequality and displacement. Combining the two terms
does not necessarily create an oxymoron, though it may lend a
nefarious, deceptive, or camouflage quality to “eco,” similar to the
criticism
of
corporate
sustainability
efforts
as
merely
129
“greenwashing.” The resulting tension should not come as a surprise:
if gentrification is a contradictory process, then ecogentrification is too.
And so local governments may find themselves on both sides of
the divide: both promoting (through subsidies, regulations, etc.)
environmental improvements in their neighborhoods and, at the same
time, feeling the pressure to address the inequalities and displacement
that may arise from these strategies.130 Communities may thus feel in
a bind: How do we deal with the trade-offs between the benefits of
environmental improvement that also make places more attractive to
residents and businesses (and raise their market value), and the
ensuing displacement of those who can no longer afford to live there by
a new culture of middle class ecoconscious, green living? Or in the words
of a recent article, “Can we green the hood without gentrifying it?”131
What makes ecogentrification a wicked problem? We see
multiple characteristics present with ecogentrification: no singular
definition or explanation of the phenomenon (overregulation of housing
and land markets? income inequality? shifting consumer tastes?
unwillingness for current tenants to relocate?); no obvious solution to
the problem; solving this problem may lead to other problems; no
128. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 149.
129. See Bruce Watson, The Troubling Evolution of Corporate Greenwashing,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
2016/aug/20/greenwashingenvironmentalism-lies-companies
[https://perma.cc/8RMY-XCK6]
(“Many companies are now working to engage customers in their sustainability efforts, even as
their core business model remains environmentally unsustainable.”).
130. Jeanne Haffner, The Dangers of Eco-Gentrification: What’s the Best Way to Make a City
Greener?, GUARDIAN (May 6, 2015, 2:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/06/
dangers-ecogentrification-best-way-make-city-greener [https://perma.cc/3K4E-LRST]; Rice et al.,
supra note 7, at 146–47.
131. Brentin Mock, Can We Green the Hood Without Gentrifying It?, GRIST (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://grist.org/cities/can-we-green-the-hood-without-gentrifying-it/
[https://perma.cc/N5NY4DPZ].
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stopping rule for policy interventions, since housing markets are fluid
and dynamic; gentrification is as much a normative as a descriptive
analytical category; and gentrification is a symptom of another problem
with dynamics such as income inequality and social-spatial mobility.132
And one might conclude that if gentrification and sustainability are
each individually complex, wicked problems, then their alliance (as
ecogentrification) leads to an even more complex, wicked problem.
From a sustainability perspective, ecogentrification arises from
the tensions across the 3Es (environment, economy, equity) of the
Planner’s Triangle,133 but the environmental improvement that gives
rise to ecogentrification does not resolve these tensions. If anything, it
worsens them. Even the ecosystem functions may be rather weak
beyond the aesthetic appeal or beautification goals of the
improvements. That is, many of these projects are not only displacing
lower-income populations, but may also amount to little more than
greenwashing as higher-income and higher-consuming populations
move in.134 Trade-offs and compensation across sectors of the population
affected are not consciously and openly deliberated and addressed. 135
For this, it would be necessary to conduct fuller ecological and social
studies—in addition to the more commonly thorough economic
analyses—and to include stakeholder participatation in these analyses
and the debates they should support. These participatory studies must
be conducted within a systems framework to fully grasp how economic
preferences and cultural aspirations generate unintended
consequences. Wolch et al. suggest the “just green enough” approach to
environmental improvement, advocating for participatory, bottom-up
planning processes that support small-scale improvements—as opposed
to grand projects of green development—to ensure that all sectors,
particularly current residents and businesses, are heard and contribute
to the transformation and benefit from it.136 Yet, the kinds of smallscale interventions Wolch et al. propose do not guarantee that
gentrification will not occur if those interventions still create an overall
attractive neighborhood for new residents and businesses, unless
financial barriers are established in the form of rent controls or

132. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 165.
133. See Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67, at 301–05 (“Slowing worldwide industrial
expansion may preserve more of the world’s resources for the future . . . but it may also undermine
the efforts of the underdeveloped world to approach the living standards of the west.”).
134. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 146.
135. See id. at 160 (discussing the “failure of many academics and practitioners to see climate
and housing justice as directly related”).
136. Wolch et al., supra note 127, at 241.
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property tax restructuring.137 The elephant in the room is the insistence
on growth as a pathway towards development and the land speculation
process that growth generates.138 Some limits must be set. Yet this
unquestioned growth is what is pushing our urban systems—and the
remote systems they depend on—to socioeconomic and environmental
collapse.139 In the meantime, the environmental needs of minorities and
low-income communities continue to be ignored, and the needs and
wants of those with higher purchasing power are prioritized.
What kind of governance problem is ecogentrification?
Governance can mean many things, but an effective public policy
response to a social problem has several prerequisites: a consensus
definition of the problem and acknowledgement that it is indeed a
“problem” requiring intervention, knowledge of cause-effect and
consequences, identification of key parties and interests, the ability to
imagine multiple interventions and evaluate and compare each, and
strategic knowledge of the scope and limits of public power
and authority.140
Here we see how ecogentrification’s nature as a wicked problem
in turn creates governance challenges. There is no consensus about the
nature of the problem, and thus the governance pathway to solutions.
At its core, is it an environmental regulation problem? Or a housing and
land use problem that might involve zoning changes or rent control? Or
a problem of income and racial inequality, including segregation? Or
instead a question of the uneven allocation of public services like parks
and other infrastructure? This multi-faceted framework of
ecogentrification raises tricky issues of whose jurisdiction the task falls
into and whether the state even has the authority to intervene. In
addition, who is the affected interest group or constituency? That is,
who wants the “problem” to be solved? This is particularly a challenge
when some groups in the region may not see “ecogentrification” as a
problem at all, but rather a misnomer for a lifestyle and residential
choice.141 The mixed blessings of ecogentrification—its contradictory
blend of positive and problematic consequences—further muddle the
search for a clear governance strategy.
137. See id. at 235 (advocating for the “just green enough” approach, which requires “planners
and local stakeholders to design green space projects that are explicitly shaped by community
concerns, needs, and desires rather than either conventional urban design formulae or
ecological restoration”).
138. William E. Rees, Economic Development and Environmental Protection, 86 ENV’T
MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 29, 32 (2003).
139. See id. at 41 (“[T]he prevailing growth-based economic ‘development’ paradigm is
fundamentally incompatible with ecological and social sustainability.”).
140. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 276.
141. See Mock, supra note 131.
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B. Case 2: Megaregional Sustainability:
A New Geography in Search of Governance
We next turn to the emergence of the megaregion as a new
urbanization form and as a sustainability governance challenge. The
megaregion leads to complex, new intergovernmental coordination
challenges (both horizontal and vertical); boundary issues; new forms
of land use; and the related political cultures of new types of settlements
beyond the old school typology of the traditional monocentric region
(cities, suburbs, rural).142
What distinguishes the megaregion from the traditional notion
of the region? The classical definition of a region is a central city and its
surrounding hinterland: inner- and outer-ring suburbs and farmland
beyond.143 One region is distinct from the next, separated by rural land
uses and wilderness; the U.S. Census codifies this notion in its
definition of the Metropolitan Statistical Area.144 We use the modifier
“metropolitan” to recognize the presence of a central city at the core of
the region—as distinct from rural regions that lack an urban core.
The megaregion is understandably larger than a conventional
region. But more importantly, it represents the complex evolution and
expansion of traditional metropolitan regions through the overlapping
and blurring of several metropolitan regions into a larger network.145
Governance in traditional metropolitan areas is problematic enough
given the lack of regional planning traditions and authorities in the
United States.146 Metropolitan planning organizations are chronically
marginalized and underfunded in the United States, and they need to
compete for resources and attention in an already crowded
interjurisdictional field at the city, county, state, and federal level (and
also townships in some states).147 Megaregions also introduce possible
142. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 130.
143. Cheryl K. Contant & Karen Leone de Nie, Scale Matters: Rethinking Planning
Approaches Across Jurisdictional and Sectoral Boundaries, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 12, at 11, 15.
144. 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 75 Fed.
Reg. 37246, 37246, 37248–50 (June 28, 2010) (notice announcing the “adoption of 2010 Standards
for Delineating Metropolitan . . . Statistical Areas,” which were influenced by Census
Bureau research).
145. Contant & Leone de Nie, supra note 143, at 15.
146. Myron Orfield & Thomas F. Luce Jr., Governing American Metropolitan Areas: Spatial
Policy and Regional Governance, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 12, at 250 (discussing the American “tradition of local [government] control” despite
the fact that the Constitution makes no mention of local governments).
147. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY O FF., GAO-09-868, METROPOLITAN PLANNING
ORGANIZATIONS: OPTIONS EXIST TO ENHANCE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING CAPACITY AND FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT 16–17 (2009) (“About 85 percent of all MPOs responding to our survey cited the lack of
transportation planning funding as a challenge to transportation planning. . . . Additionally, 71
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competition and tension between multiple central cities within
the megaregion.148
For its supporters, the megaregion represents a new, dynamic,
and competitive geographic actor in the global economy—a large
multicentric conglomeration that has the scale, shared infrastructure
(airports, highways, housing, office, and labor markets), and diverse
array of amenities to compete in the big leagues.149 For its detractors,
the megaregion is a sprawling mess—the latest mutation in the
distinctively American proclivity to commute long distances, convert
farmland into suburbia, overconsume land and open space, and
obliterate the needed greenbelt boundaries between one region and the
next.150 As such, it represents for some the failure of American political
culture to plan adequately, act as wise stewards of the land, and reign
in reckless real estate markets. The rise of megaregional development
has far outpaced our ability to keep up with the capacity to govern. The
megaregion is an appealing spatial phenomenon, an emerging
analytical category, and a set of normative aspirations that has not yet
become a functioning administrative unit.
The United States currently has eleven commonly recognized
megaregions, as promoted by the Regional Plan Association’s work on
America 2050.151 The largest is the Northeast megaregion, stretching
along Interstate 95 and Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor from Boston and
coastal New England, through New York City, to Philadelphia and
Baltimore, down through Washington, D.C., and into Virginia.152 Sixty
years ago, before the popular rise of the term “megaregion,” the
geographer Jean Gottmann named this agglomeration “Megalopolis.”153
Some of these megaregions have a relatively coherent
geographic structure—with their polycentric structure (and multiple
central cities) nevertheless dominated by a large central city: the
Piedmont Atlantic (with Atlanta at its core), the Front Range (Denver),
Arizona Sun Corridor (Phoenix), and Southern California (Los
Angeles).154 Other megaregions have multiple urban cores where no one
percent of small MPO survey respondents cited competing priorities between transportation
planning and other tasks related to the council of governments as a challenge.”).
148. Orfield & Luce, supra note 146, at 251.
149. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 128.
150. See id. at 132–33.
151. See Hagler, supra note 11, at 1.
152. REG’L PLAN ASS’N, NORTHEAST MEGAREGION 2050: A COMMON FUTURE 9 (2007),
https://rpa.org/uploads/pdfs/2050-Northeast-Megaregion-A-Common-Future.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KMY7-MF6W].
153. JEAN GOTTMAN, MEGALOPOLIS: THE URBANIZED NORTHEASTERN SEABOARD OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1961).
154. See Hagler, supra note 11, at 6, 7.
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city overwhelmingly dominates: Cascadia (Vancouver, Seattle,
Portland, the Willamette Valley), Northern California (San Francisco,
Oakland, San Jose/Silicon Valley, Sacramento), the Texas Triangle
(Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, San Antonio, Austin), the Gulf Coast
(stretching from Alabama to the Texas-Mexico border), the sprawling
urban conglomerations of Florida, and the physically decentralized
megaregion of the Great Lakes.155
This set of megaregions is notably a diverse group, with wide
variation in history, size, internal structure, economic strength,
ecology, and cultural identity.156 Some assert their megaregional
identity through shared ecological features (such as Cascadia),157 while
others assert their dynamic, business-friendly, and economically
competitive cultures (such as the Piedmont Atlantic or the
Texas Triangle).158
The megaregion raises complex new challenges for
sustainability governance. Geographers and systems planners
understandably are attracted by the promise of the megaregion: the
comprehensive scale is large enough to encompass the holistic scale of
large spatial systems, be it environmental (watersheds, air basins,
habitats),159 socioeconomic (labor and housing markets),160 or logistical
(transportation and other infrastructure, supply chains within
industrial clusters).161 Yet this large scale invariably means that
planning and regulation require coordination across many jurisdictions,
both horizontally (city to city, county to county, sometimes state to
state) and vertically (between city, county, state, and even federal
governments).162 The result is a multidimensional complexity of
interjurisdictional cooperation, where mutual mistrust and a lack of a
strong regional administrative tradition (or jurisprudence) in the
United States often lead localities to balk at region-wide efforts—even
when the resulting benefits are all too apparent, at least to planners.163
155. See id.
156. See id. at 6.
157. AM. 2050, REG’L PLAN ASS’N, CONNECTING CASCADIA: A HIGH-SPEED RAIL VISION FOR
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 3–4 (2010), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/2050Connecting-Cascadia-Briefing-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QKF-6XPA].
158. Ming Zhang, Frederick Steiner & Kent Butler, Connecting the Texas Triangle: Economic
Integration and Transportation Coordination, REG’L PLAN ASS’N & LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y 21,
26–27 (2007), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/2050-The-Healdsburg-ResearchSeminar-on-Megaregions-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMK2-Q8Z7].
159. Campbell, supra note 12, at 128.
160. Orfield & Luce, supra note 146, at 252.
161. Catherine L. Ross & Jessica L.H. Doyle, The Megaregion and the Future of American
Planning, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 12, at 280, 285.
162. See Orfield & Luce, supra note 146, at 250.
163. Contant & Leone de Nie, supra note 143, at 14.
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Adding to this interjurisdictional complexity is the inherent
complexity and uncertainty of spatial planning. Urban planning is an
inherently interdisciplinary activity that has long since broken with its
early twentieth-century legacy as simply architecture (focusing on the
building and site) enlarged to the city scale (i.e., urban design).164 Over
the decades, through eras of crisis and transformation—from the Great
Depression and New Deal through postwar suburbanization, 1970s
deindustrialization and urban crisis, Reagan-era neoliberalism and
today’s multicultural globalization and climate crisis—planning has
repeatedly reinvented itself as it grew into new areas.165 On the
traditional foundations of physical planning (land use, zoning, and
urban design), urban planning has expanded into housing, community
advocacy, economic development, transportation, environmentalism,
social justice, international development, and climate adaptation.166
Today’s planning school graduates enter a planning workforce that
extends far beyond the zoning desk and architecture firms.
This broad set of priorities and methodologies makes for an
excitingly diverse professional discipline. But it also means that
planning—working in an open field of problems with permeable
boundaries—has an uncertain mandate and authority in its work.
Rittel and Webber traced wicked problems to the dynamics of the “open
societal systems” of cities, where it is difficult to definitively formulate
problems, clearly articulate a set of potential solutions, test solutions,
or conclusively “solve” a problem without realizing that the initial
problem is merely a symptom of another problem.167
So, the planner, in confronting the challenges of these emergent
megaregions, faces two complexities: the spatial complexity of a large,
internally diverse and unruly area sprawling over thousands of square
miles and the disciplinary complexity of multiple tasks and urban
systems often in the absence of clear administrative authority or
adequate resources. Governance becomes less a task of the direct
implementation of plans and enforcement of regulations and more the

164. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 156.
165. See Fainstein, supra note 59 (tracing urban planning’s development and growth as a
discipline); PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF URBAN PLANNING
AND DESIGN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (4th ed. 2014) (surveying modern planning literature
and providing a comprehensive overview of the discipline’s progression).
166. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 131–32; Bishwapriya Sanyal, Lawrence J. Vale &
Christina D. Rosan, Four Planning Conversations, in PLANNING IDEAS THAT MATTER: LIVABILITY,
TERRITORIALITY, GOVERNANCE, AND REFLECTIVE PRACTICE 1, 4–5 (Bishwapriya Sanyal, Michael
Teitz & Christina D. Rosan eds., 2012).
167. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 160 (noting that “the classical paradigm of science
and engineering—the paradigm that has underlain modern professionalism—is not applicable to
the problems of open societal systems” presented by urban planning issues).
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task of building alliances, mediating conflicts between the many
stakeholders, and leveraging the limited power and resources of
planning agencies. Governance also involves promoting a shared vision
of regional development and identity, facilitating community
participation in regional planning efforts, and helping the community
translate ideas into the maps, plans, and agendas of regional
development. And since building regional communities and identity is
a slow-moving, never-ending process over many years, planners need to
play the long game, combining patience and persistence and marking
intermediate successes to boost morale.
In the end, the megaregion evokes a new, greatly enlarged
spatial scale without a coherent and articulated set of institutions to
manage and guide its development. The social and environmental
opportunities and challenges are numerous, from massive
infrastructural projects to the loss of farmland and wilderness, social
inequality in access to work, public services, and amenities, and the
challenges of long commutes and unaffordable housing. 168 The shifting
emphasis on megaregions has no intrinsic stance towards
sustainability. The megaregion opens up possibilities for new kinds of
integrated ecological planning and land management and coordination
across multiple jurisdictions.169 And yet the megaregion has no intrinsic
stance towards sustainability, and such large-scale development opens
up new pathways to greater resource extraction, more expansive urban
land uses, and exploitation.170 And unless one is an ardent true believer
in the ability of private markets to resolve environmental, social, and
land use conflicts, the megaregion presents novel planning challenges
and dynamic, complex, and unpredictable consequences that existing
local and county institutions are ill-equipped to handle. Megaregions
are an emerging urbanization phenomenon in search of new
governance models.
IV. UNPACKING COMPLEXITY TO UNDERSTAND ECOGENTRIFICATION
AND THE CHALLENGES OF MEGAREGIONAL SUSTAINABILITY
The analytical power of complex systems thinking is not simply
to describe and diagnose wicked problems such as environmental
168. See Tridib Banerjee, Megaregions or Megasprawls? Issues of Density, Urban Design, and
Quality Growth, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 12, at 83,
91–92 (“[Q]uestions of future density, affordable housing, environmental justice, equality in
educational opportunity, equity in access to open space and amenities for public life, improved
mobility, equal promises and possibilities for healthy living, and the like are all inextricably linked
to the structure and institutions of local governance in America.”).
169. Campbell, supra note 12, at 128.
170. Id. at 131–33.
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degradation and the climate crisis, but also to lead to the next step of
engaging these problems and developing strategic planning
responses.171 How might a complexity perspective and its tools help
understand the unresolved tensions of sustainability and point towards
paths forward to address these conflicts? In this Part we examine the
potential of systems thinking, which provides tools to model the
interaction of factors that perpetuate pollution and gentrification
problems. In particular, we discuss the use of causal loop diagrams
(several examples included below), a method to articulate how the
causal interconnection of variables influences the behavior of parts of a
system and how the connection across these parts into the larger system
may lead to unintended consequences.172 This discussion might seem a
detour into a rather detailed method, but it graphically illustrates how
we can use complex systems thinking in the engagement and
governance of wicked problems.
Causal loop diagrams employ several conventions. The
components or variables must clearly increase or decrease.173 The name
of the variable should also always be positive or neutral in value so it is
clear whether it is increasing or decreasing (e.g., “tax base” over
“decreasing tax base”).174 The other part of a causal loop diagram is the
relationship among variables. The direction of this relationship may be
direct or inverse.175 In the first case, when the causal component
increases, the effect it is linked to will also increase. Otherwise, when
the cause increases, the effect decreases. As an illustration, as
environmental quality in a lake increases, the fish population will also
increase, which will in turn drive up the number of fishermen. These
three factors (environmental quality, fish population, and number of
fishermen) would be linked with two arrows (one originating in
environmental quality towards fish population, and one from fish
population to number of fishermen), showing a direct relationship (they
all increase or decrease together). The increase in fishermen, however,
would also decrease the fish population, so an arrow would originate
from the number of fishermen to fish population, in this case an inverse
relationship because as the former increases, the latter decreases, or
vice versa.

171. See supra Table 2; Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3,
at 260–61.
172. Daniel H. Kim, Guidelines for Drawing Causal Loop Diagrams, 3 SYS. THINKER 1,
1–3 (1992).
173. Id. at 2.
174. See id. (explaining best practices for choosing variable names).
175. Id. at 1.
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Using the above guidelines and way of thinking, we can propose
a diagram that may explain how ecogentrification arises. Figure 2a
shows one proposal for how it might work in a mostly industrial
community surrounded by low-income neighborhoods, as may be the
case for Pilsen, a neighborhood in the Lower West Side of Chicago. The
purple variables generally refer to economic factors, the green to
environmental, and the yellow to social. The blue and red arrows
correspond to direct and indirect relationships, respectively, while the
dashed arrows indicate relationships that can be either direct or
inverse. The processes leading to ecogentrification can be understood by
parsing out the system in smaller stories and identifying the selfreinforcing loops (virtuous or vicious cycles) and the balancing loops.
FIGURE 2A: CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF ECOGENTRIFICATION

In this first part of the story, encapsulated in Figure 2b, we
highlight the economic development process of having factories and
businesses that supply jobs. The operation of factories and businesses
will generate more traffic, as will the number of jobs, assuming
employees will also contribute to traffic as they get to and from work.
All this economic activity generates tax revenue. It is uncertain
whether factories contribute to tax revenues, as it is not uncommon for
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them to make deals with local government to have their taxes waived
in exchange for jobs (hence the dashed line).
FIGURE 2B: CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF ECOGENTRIFICATION (SUBSET)

Tax revenue can also provide the resources needed to green a
neighborhood by financing the development of green space. The
problem is that such improvements also increase land value, like
infrastructure does.176 Air quality may improve with such green space,
but it will have to make up for whatever pollution is still being emitted
by factories, rising traffic, and the general greater consumption of an
increasing population. Environmental justice groups have led many
efforts towards improvements in air quality and public health,
particularly in low-income neighborhoods where polluting activities
tend to be located.177 In some cases, they may even be successful in
176. Wolch et al., supra note 127, at 238 (“In addition, new studies suggest that urban greening
efforts may also be inflating property values . . . potentially leading to gentrification and thus
displacing lower-income earners.”).
177. ANA ISABEL BAPTISTA, TISHMAN ENV’T & DESIGN CTR., THE NEW SCH., LOCAL POLICIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NATIONAL SCAN 13, 19–22 (2019), https://www.nrdc.org/
sites/default/files/local-policies-environmental-justice-national-scan-tishman-201902.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JPC2-42AN].
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removing the polluting sources from their communities.178
Paradoxically, however, by triggering environmental improvements,
which consequently improve public health and reduce the burden on
public services, the system is set to increase land values and displace
the very population that initiated the improvement. The Bloomingdale
Trail in Chicago (a former elevated railway converted into a greenway)
is a prime example of such transformations.179 Figure 2c illustrates the
mechanisms by which this displacement occurs.
FIGURE 2C: CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF ECOGENTRIFICATION (SUBSET)

As land values increase, so do taxes and the tax revenue that a
local government can collect. Jobs also contribute to land value as they
attract residents to the area. As land values (and taxes and rent)
increase, neighborhood income levels increase, reinforcing the rise of
land value as the general demand for land by higher-income
178. Id. at 27–28.
179. Ryan Ori, Affordable Housing Is Vanishing as Gentrification Casts a Shadow over the
606, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 15, 2020, 2:57 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/ryan-ori/ct-biz606-trail-housing-prices-ryan-ori-20200115-wvjgab2h2zd63ko33t2xqerkiy-story.html
[https://
perma.cc/T547-CMBJ].
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populations increases. Rising land values may increase the
attractiveness of the neighborhood for higher-income residents but
deter the lower-income residents (hence the dashed line). A higher tax
revenue, supported by residents, increases land values, attracts
businesses, and further solidifies this self-reinforcing trend, as now
there are more resources to invest in infrastructure and public services,
which further increases land value and attracts residents and
businesses. The greater number of residents and businesses, however,
will generate more consumption and pollution, in terms of traffic,
energy use, and waste generation (not shown in the diagram, for
simplicity). Factories in this case may have a detrimental effect and
eventually be pushed out of these now more expensive neighborhoods.
While this could be mostly an economic process, it can also become a
political one, as observed above. With a higher-income population, there
may be greater chances of success to remove the polluting sources. What
this does, however, is simply move the problem elsewhere, typically to
another low-income community. The move of General Iron Industrial
Inc. (a scrap metal processor) from Lincoln Park to the Southeast Side
in Chicago is an example of such a process, which now becomes a
regional problem.180 Figure 2d illustrates these intricate relationships.

180. David Roeder, Scrap Metal Recycler General Iron Reaches Deal to Vacate North Side
Site, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019, 6:59 PM CDT), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
news/2019/9/11/20861601/general-iron-scrap-metal-labkon [https://perma.cc/KV44-YLF4].
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FIGURE 2D: CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF ECOGENTRIFICATION (SUBSET)

These four diagrams illustrate the complex linkage of the first of
our two case studies: ecogentrification. Although not provided here, one
could draw an analogous set of diagrams to examine our second case:
megaregional sustainability challenges. As an illustration, we focus on
regional pollution, where the factories that are displaced from an area
thanks to environmental activism and economic pressures are now
moved to an area that may have a similar internal systemic structure,
but the new area has a very diminished tax base. That further
reinforces the process of lowering land value in that area, which further
diminishes any chance of investments leading to a stronger tax base.
With a diminishing tax base, divestment in public services and
infrastructure ensues, leading to further business and population loss.
In the originating neighborhood, the added consumption that goes hand
in hand with increased income levels imposes other regional burdens.
For example, pollution and resource depletion increase locally, such as
through traffic, depending on the way in which energy, food, and other
goods are produced to support that community’s consumption. As
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already high-resourced areas flourish economically and win their local
environmental battles (although perhaps only aesthetically), lowerincome communities are further depleted in what becomes a classic case
of environmental injustice.
How does applying a complex system view to this problem help
inform governance questions? We can use causal loop diagrams like the
ones above to identify which are the mechanisms that backfire, either
by reinforcing an exclusionary mechanism, or by cancelling out any
environmental or social benefits. Once identified, they can be the focus
of targeted interventions to ensure environmental improvements
without the social drawbacks. For example, one aspect to consider here
is the role of a community’s tax base in ensuring the economic
sustainability of different efforts. On one hand, polluting sources, if
maintained, must heavily contribute to this tax base, something that is
rarely done. Providing jobs is not enough. The other is that, as land
value increases, economic controls and property tax restructuring can
be set in place to ensure that low-income residents can benefit from a
higher quality of life and not be displaced. This, however, will only work
as long as we limit the influx of new residents (growth), given that, at
some level, more residents and businesses start burdening the system
with increased consumption and pollution produced by higher economic
activity. Without such controls in place, a neighborhood could ostensibly
oscillate between cycles of economic booms and busts. The same selfreinforcing mechanisms that support a transition towards
gentrification can also lead to a vicious downward cycle of
disinvestment, worsening environmental quality, and outmigration (a
“death spiral”), seen in too many communities where pollution is
exported. Checks and balances, however, can help stabilize a system
over extended periods of time.
In brief, causal loop diagrams make visible the interconnected
forces of an urban system, illustrating how dynamic feedback loops can
trigger vicious and virtuous cycles and exacerbate the unequal
development of thriving and struggling neighborhoods. These diagrams
also reveal points of potential intervention, where strategic policies and
investments can leverage positive change that reverberates throughout
the system. Yes, these diagrams are highly conceptual representations
with unavoidable simplifications, but this simplicity also makes them
more transparent and accessible. Planners can develop these diagrams
collaboratively with community stakeholders and thereby support
efforts to address the wickedness of urban problems. These causal loop
diagrams are one of many complex systems tools, including
system dynamics modeling, fuzzy cognitive mapping, and
agent-based modeling.
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CONCLUSION: ADAPTATION, COMPLEXITY, GOVERNANCE
This Article has explored the links between wicked problems,
complex systems, sustainability, and governance from the perspective
of urban planning and development, using as illustrations the
two emergent spatial phenomena of ecogentrification and
megaregional sustainability.
Governance of urban systems is not a straightforward, neutral
task. As a result, we employ an expansive definition of governance,
including both formal government institutions and a rich array of
private and nonprofit organizations. The result is a pluralistic,
dynamic, and complex system of urbanization and change, in which
formal municipal regulatory agencies have only limited authority and
resources. One therefore cannot approach cities with the same singleminded focus on efficiency, optimization, or Tayloristic management as
found in operations research, civil engineering, or accounting. Cities are
inherently diverse, political, resource constrained, and lacking complete
information.181 Because cities are complex, open social systems that
lead to wicked problems, urban governance is invariably the
management of wicked problems. Planning engages “tame,” tractable
problems as well, though these understandably generate less
controversy and attention. And because cities are internally
heterogeneous, with uneven development, inequality, segregation, and
zones of inclusion and exclusion, addressing social justice has a long
(but often uneven) tradition in urban planning.
This “open system” extends beyond the city limits into nature as
well. Planners must therefore govern the interaction between the city
and the countryside and between humans and the rest of the planet.
This has led to the profession’s recent commitment to promoting
sustainable urbanism, a broadly defined concept. Urban governance
then becomes the mediation of conflicts between environmental
protection, local economic development, and social equity, and
ultimately a challenge to growth as a solution for socioeconomic
problems.182 As a wicked complex problem, the governance of
sustainable cities will not lead to a tidy, stable solution with the end
result of an optimal, balanced, and sustainable city, but instead will

181. See supra Table 1.
182. See generally Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67 (noting that traditional aims of urban
planning are inherently in tension with sustainability goals and presenting “the Planner’s
Triangle”); Campbell, supra note 49 (noting that urban planners seek to balance sustainability
and social justice); Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67 (reexamining the
Planner’s Triangle twenty years after its inception).
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likely be an ongoing effort, full of trial and error, support,
and opposition.
We conclude this Article with a more ambitious and speculative
conception of a sustainable social order. The transition to support the
governance of sustainability—moving from Stage 2 to Stage 3 in Table
2—involves reimagining the Planner’s Triangle as a more complex and
multidimensional representation, as illustrated in Figure 3. While its
simplicity is compelling, its two-dimensional representation limits us to
binary tensions, without being able to understand the fuller depth of
the system. We advocate for a stronger inclusion of complex systems
thinking and analysis: from 3Es to 3D.183
FIGURE 3: SUSTAINABILITY IN A DYNAMIC WORLD OF
BIOPHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS

The triangle of social priorities, bounded by the circle of the four
classical elements, represents the acknowledgment that human activity
must operate within a finite biophysical world. Though a bounded
world, this is not a static world, but one of creative destruction that is
183. Source cited supra note 3.
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in constant flux—hence the fading circle of basic life elements. As long
as we remain within those bounds, then we can be sustainable in the
provision of goods and services, though the achievement of
sustainability does not guarantee fairness or stability. Sustainable
human settlements, therefore, are a necessary prerequisite but not a
sufficient or complete condition for a better society.
If we therefore place well-being, rather than sustainability, at
the pinnacle of our future goals, then we must collectively build the
institutional, socioeconomic, and physical capital to support resilient
systems to provide services equitably across the various sectors of the
global population. This ambitious goal requires several crucial
accomplishments: an understanding of the interconnectedness of social,
economic, and environmental variables; the identification and
restructuring of intervention/leverage points that trigger pernicious
self-reinforcing processes; and the promotion of appropriate balancing
mechanisms that can stabilize a socioecological system. We illustrated
how to unpack this complexity with causal loop diagramming for our
two cases (ecogentrification and megaregional sustainability). While
conceptual, these are powerful tools to support dialogue,
understanding, policy innovation, and resolution of trade-offs. Causal
loop diagrams can also serve as a foundation for other quantitative
techniques like system dynamics and agent-based modeling, to more
precisely inform policy and governance. The way to operationalize this
activity within planning and governance is to rely on approaches such
as participatory modeling, which can represent the biophysical limits
while keeping track of the evolving complexity that society must always
work with, in addition to acknowledging and building on the also
evolving diversity of values and needs of different communities.184
Thus, urban governance is not the process of planning a sustainable end
state and permanently achieving it, but rather a never-ending process
of transformation and reformulation of our social, economic, and
institutional structures.

184. See generally Charles Hoch, Moira Zellner, Dan Milz, Josh Radinsky & Leilah Lyons,
Seeing Is Not Believing: Cognitive Bias and Modelling in Collaborative Planning, 16 PLAN. THEORY
& PRAC. 319 (2015); Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3.

